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Abstract.
This paper discusses the methodological views of David Hendry. A critique is given
on the ‘reification’ of the so-called Data Generating Process. The merits of general to
specific modelling are analyzed. Hendry’s neo-Popperian philosophy is examined. It
is argued that this philosophy is not able to transform econometrics from ‘alchemy’ to
‘science’.
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h.a.keuzenkamp@kub.nl‘What seek ye in this country?’
‘Sir,’ said Launcelot, ‘I go to seek the adventures of the Sangrail.’
‘Well,’ said he, ‘seek it ye may well, but though it were here ye
shall have no power to see it no more than a blind man should
see a bright sword, and that is due to your sin, and else ye were
more abler than any man living.’
And then Sir Launcelot began to weep.
Sir Thomas Malory, Le Morte d’Arthur, Book XV, Chapter 2.
1. Introduction
1,2
During the last two decades, David Hendry has been a leading participant in the
debate on econometric methodology. His influence in applied econometrics, especially
in the UK and Europe, is large. This is due to original insights, a penetrating style of
writing and a zeal that has made many scholars enthusiastic about econometrics.
Hendry’s ‘econometrics in action’ seminars, presented during the mid-eighties, were
not only thought-provoking but also highly entertaining. They illustrated and advanced
the breakthrough in computer-aided econometrics education. Different versions of PC-
GIVE reflect this development.
Hendry belongs to the small group of econometricians with very explicit methodological
views. Those views are scattered throughout many of his publications, but have been
made readily accessible by means of a sample of 18 of Hendry’s contributions to
econometrics, collected in the volume ‘Econometrics: Alchemy or Science’ (Hendry,
1 This paper was written during a visit to the Centre for the Philosophy of the
Natural and Social Sciences at London School of Economics. I would like to thank
Mark Blaug, Michael McAleer, Les Oxley, Stephen Pollock, Ron Smith, Mark Steel and
participants at seminars at the London School of Economics and Exeter University for
helpful comments on previous drafts. Financial support from the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged.
2 This paper is a review essay of David F. Hendry (1993), Econometrics: Alchemy
or Science? Essays in Econometric Methodology, Blackwell, Oxford; ISBN 1-55786-
264-8; £50.00. References without author and year apply to this volume of papers.2
1993).
3 The papers, published between 1971 and 1985, are accompanied by new
preambles and a postscript. The first essay, from which the title of the book originates,
is Hendry’s inaugural lecture at the London School of Economics. It serves, in a
sense, as an introduction to the whole volume. Like many other inaugural lectures, it
is like a mission statement. The preambles of the other papers explain, with hindsight,
the context and innovations, but also the shortcomings, of the respective papers. The
book is divided in four parts: (1) Roots and route maps; (2) empirical modelling
strategies (including ‘DHSY’); (3) formalization (including the classic Exogeneity paper,
co-authored with Engle and Richard); and (4) retrospect and prospect (including ‘the
econometrics of PC-GIVE’).
As the papers themselves have appeared in respected journals and books, the
purpose of this essay is not to assess Hendry’s ability as an academic econometrician.
Indeed, there is no doubting Hendry’s skills and the technical quality of his methods.
But Hendry aims higher, at methodology. Here, he is on shaky ground. Not
surprisingly, Hendry’s methodological views have been controversial, in particular
outside the UK. The value added of Alchemy or Science is primarily its effort to
provide an anthology of his methodological thinking. The preambles to the essays
particularly serve this purpose. Hence, I will focus on methodology.
4
Before doing so, consider briefly the paper with the mission statement, Alchemy or
Science, itself. The example on which it builds is not especially different from that in
a paper by George Udny Yule (1926), in which the pitfalls of time series analysis are
illustrated by means of correlating marriages and mortality in England and Wales from
1866 to 1911. Likewise, Hendry uses cumulative rainfall in order to explain inflation in
the UK. We all are (or should be) familiar with the emerging point, which is the same
3 Hendry’s bibliography, presented at the end of the book, contains 86 scientific
publications.
4 Some useful reviews of Hendry’s econometric methodology have been published
in the past (Gilbert, 1986; Pagan, 1987, 1994). Another source of interest is the
Econometric Theory dialogue (Hendry, Leamer and Poirier, 1990). Somewhat
surprisingly, Hendry (1987) has been omitted in the collection of essays, but the
arguments given in that paper recur in the papers that are included.3
as that of Yule and of Granger and Newbold (1974). The fact that this point had to be
reiterated more than fifty years after Yule’s investigations says much about the state
of modern econometrics!
Whereas Yule was preoccupied with the question of whether differencing or detrending
would be the best way forward (a question still bothering time series analysts today),
Hendry’s remedy for nonsense correlations (‘alchemy’) are the three golden rules,
‘test, test and test’. This trinity was not really available in the time of Yule, and has
been problematic in statistical research since its development.
5 Those three cheers
for statistical testing are Hendry’s way of transforming econometrics from alchemy to
science. Econometrics, Hendry writes in the general introduction, ‘is potentially
scientific precisely because alchemy is creatable, detectable and refutable’ (1993, p.
1).
6 I will review Hendry’s methodological views, starting with the general and then
considering some specific issues--a fruitful routine, it is said.
Section 2 contains a brief discussion of alchemy. Section 3 considers the Holy Grail,
better known as the Data Generation Process. Section 4 provides a discussion on the
merits of a general-to-specific modelling strategy. Section 5 deals with Hendry’s
references to the philosophy of science, in particular Popper and Lakatos. Section 6
discusses the importance of model design and the consequences for inference.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
5 Keynes (1939) refers to ‘the mine Yule sprang’ under time series statistics (see
Hendry, p. 20). The question is whether there has been significant progress beyond
the stage of Yule (1926). An enormous literature on the AR(1) model, yielding an
extravagance of ever more complicated test statistics (a cursory look at issues of
Econometrica around 1990 shows the point), has not helped to raise time series
econometrics to a more scientific (credible?) level. The recent fad of calibrating
dynamic models rather than estimating them is a ‘j’accuse’ of some applied
economists against the incredibility of modern macroeconometrics. Of course,
calibration is more likely a symptom of the disease than the cure (ingredients in
calibrated models tend to be microeconometric findings).
6 Ironically, the alchemist philosophy (influenced by Aristotelian thought) in a
nutshell is to go from potentials to actuals.4
2. Alchemy
The early econometricians, in particular Jan Tinbergen, were regularly accused by
John Maynard Keynes of practising alchemy (see e.g. Hendry’s quotation, p. 14) or
black magic. The alchemists tried to transmute lead to gold, but not quite successfully,
as we know. As Chauser wrote about the ‘Oxford Cleric’ - a student in alchemy - in
the Prologue to his Canterbury Tales, ‘But al be that he was a philosophre, Yet hadde
he but litel gold in cofre’.
7 Alchemy has a bad connotation. However, the fact is that
the alchemists gathered impressive empirical knowledge about basic chemical facts.
This knowledge enabled the growth of chemistry. What was it that made chemistry,
unlike alchemy, a science? This question is hard to answer (and it may well be that
the question itself is flawed). It is certainly not a lack of ‘the experimental method’, as
alchemists experimented like mad.
8 In popular writings, alchemy is considered to be
measurement without theory (or with a wrong theory - but are not all theories wrong?).
Perhaps a more convincing view is that alchemy is science with wrong (or, more
precisely, unattainable) aims.
9 Perhaps the unintended success in activities other than
making gold, and finally discarding the unattainable aim itself, yielded chemistry the
respect that (time series) econometrics has yet to gain.
One of the salient features of alchemy is the use of a mystical and symbolic language.
Econometrics is not much different. We have become familiar with the notion of an
hypothetical infinite population used in an investigation of money-inflation data for the
UK from 1952-I to 1992-IV. Alchemy or Science adds some modernisms. The reader
7 The (1977) Penguin Books edition of the Canterbury Tales, translated in modern
English by Nevill Coghill, reads (p. 27):
‘Though a philosopher, as I have told,
He had not found the stone for making gold.’
8 It may be, however, that a characteristic of experiments in alchemy is the lack
of replicability, and replicability is an important feature of science. I owe this
suggestion to Mark Blaug.
9 The fact that the aims are ‘wrong’ or unattainable is, of course, reasoning with
hindsight. It should not be understood as a critique of the alchemists.5
is treated to ‘congruence’, the Haavelmo distribution, parsimonious encompassing and
other mystifying idiosyncrasies.
10 Where the alchemists spoke of panacea or
arcanum (the medicine against all ills), Hendry prescribes tests. But those fine words
do not suffice to transfer econometrics from alchemy to science. Repeatedly, Hendry
advocates testing on ground that it is criticism that should be the core of scientific
method in econometrics. So let us practise criticism!
3. The Data Generation Process
The ‘Data Generation Process’ (DGP) is the Holy Grail of Hendry’s econometrics.
11
It is a highly dimensional probability distribution for a huge vector of variables, w,
conditional on initial conditions (W0), parameters wt ÎW t , continuity (needed for a










density representation) and time homogeneity (ft()= f ( )). It is a recurring theme in
Hendry’s writings as well as in the writings of his adepts (to use alchemist
terminology). A DGP is a well defined notion in Monte Carlo studies, where the
investigator is able to generate the data and knows exactly the characteristics of the
generating process. However, this notion is transferred to applied econometrics, which
is supposed to deal with the study of the properties of the DGP (p. 13). The theory of
reduction intends to bring this incomprehensive distribution down to a parsimonious
model, without loss of relevant information. Marginalizing and conditioning are two key
notions of this theory of reduction.
In applied econometrics, Hendry argues, ‘the data are given, and so the distributions
10 Just an example: ‘Congruence is a relation between the model and the
Haavelmo distribution’ (p. 271).
11 Both words, ‘generation’ and ‘generating’, are used (e.g. p. 393 and p. 394,
respectively).6
of the dependent variables are already fixed by what the data generating process
created them to be--I knew that from Monte Carlo’ (p. 73). Apart from the data, there
are models (sets of hypotheses). Given the data, the goal is to make inferences
concerning the hypotheses. This is reasoning from the sample to the population (in the
terminology of frequentist probability theory), or inductive inference. In the theory of
reduction, the idea is that the DGP (or population) can be used as a starting point as
well as a goal of inference. Econometric models are regarded as reductions of the
DGP (p. 247).
Although the DGP is sometimes presented as ‘hypothetical’ (e.g. p. 364--perhaps this
is the influence of co-author Jean François Richard), there is a tendency in Hendry’s
writings to view ‘the’ DGP not as an hypothesis (of many possible hypotheses), but
as fact or reality. Sometimes the DGP is presented as ‘the relevant data generation
process’ (p. 74). In other instances, the DGP becomes the ‘actual mechanism that
generates the data’ (Hendry and Ericsson, 1991, p. 18), or simply ‘the actual DGP’
(Spanos, 1986). Taking the DGP as a starting point or inference is, from a
methodological point of view, highly objectionable, except perhaps in Monte Carlo
studies. The related issue of general-to-specific modelling (and the theory of reduction)
will be discussed in Section 6 below. Here, I will focus on the status of the DGP itself.
The DGP is reality and a model of reality at the same time.
12 Philosophers call this
‘reification’. Once this position is taken, weird consequences follow. Consider the
‘information taxonomy’ that ‘follows directly from the theory of reduction given the
sequence of steps needed to derive any model from the data generation process’ (p.
271; see also p. 358). Or, econometric models are ‘derived and derivable from the
DGP’ (Hendry and Ericsson, 1990, p. 20; emphasis added). Is this science,
metaphysics, or yet another version of the economist in the desert with an unopened
can, who proposes ‘let us assume we have a can opener’? Consider another example
of reification: the proposition that ‘it is a common empirical finding that DGP’s are
12 This conflation is explicitly recognized on p. 77; see also p. 86: ‘a correct model
should be capable of predicting the residual variance of an incorrect model and any
failure to do this demonstrates that the first model is not the DGP’.7
subject to interventions affecting some of their parameters’ (p. 373). Rather, those
empirical findings relate to statistical models of the data, not to the DGP or its
parameters. Bruno de Finetti is known for his phrase ‘probability does not exist’,
meaning to say that it is an invention of our mind. The same applies to the DGP or its
parameters. The DGP does not exist.
Modelsareusefulapproximationstoreality.Differentpurposesrequiredifferentmodels
(and often different data, concerning levels of aggregation, numbers of observations).
The idea that there is one DGP waiting to be discovered is a form of medieval
romanticism that suits the legend of the Holy Grail, but not modern science.
13 Neither
is it, nor should it be, the task of the econometrician ‘to model the main features of the
data generation process’ (p. 445; emphasis added). It may even be the purpose of the
econometrician (or policymaker) to change the economic process in response to
econometric inference or predictions. This may involve self-fulfilling (or self-denying)
prophecies, which are hard (if not impossible) to reconcile with the notion of a DGP.
4. General to specific
An important characteristic of Hendry’s methodology is his general-to-specific (GTS)
approach to modelling. It was initially inspired by Denis Sargan’s Common Factor
(COMFAC) test, where a general model is needed as a starting point for testing a
lagged set of variables corresponding to an autoregressive error process. Another
source of inspiration was the reductionist approach developed at CORE (in particular,
by Jean-Pierre Florens, Michel Mouchart and Jean-François Richard). The theory of
reduction, of which Ronald A. Fisher may be regarded as a pioneer, deals with the
conditions for valid marginalizing and conditioning (relying on sufficient statistics).
14
13 Alternatively, the belief in the DGP can be regarded as extreme scientific
realism, whereas my critique stems from an instrumentalistic attitude.
14 However, note that Fisher does not claim to reduce the DGP, but rather to
reduce a large set of data without losing relevant information.8
The basic idea of GTS is that there is a starting point for all inference, the data
generation process. All models are reductions of the DGP, but not all of them are valid
reductions. In the following, a brief outline of reduction will be sketched. Subsequently,
a methodological critique is given. Reconsider the DGP, (1). The variable vector w
contains only few variables that are likely to be relevant. These are labelled y
*, the
remainder is w
* (nuisance variables). Using the definition of conditional probability,
15




*. The interest is on the marginal density, f1.I fw 1 and w2 are
(2) f(wt,yt Wt 1,Yt 1,w1) f1(yt Wt 1,Yt 1,w1)f2(wt Wt 1,yt,Yt 1,w2)
variation free ( (w1,w2) ÎW 1 ´W2 ; i.e. f2 does not provide information about W1) then,
a ‘sequential cut’ may be operated: consider only f1. Assuming furthermore that yt
* and
Wt-1
* are independent conditionally on Yt-1
* and w1, the nuisance variables can be
dropped from f1, which yields:
This can be represented using a specific probabilistic and functional form (e.g. a
(3) f(yt Yt 1,w1).
Vector Autoregression, VAR). Note that this marginalizing stage of the reduction
process proceeds entirely implicitly. It is impossible to consider empirically all
conceivable variables of interest to start with. Note also that many hidden assumptions
are made (e.g. going from distributions to densities, assuming linearity, parametric
distributions, constant parameters). Some of them may be testable but most are taken
for granted.
16
The second stage, conditioning, aims at a further reduction by introducing exogeneity
into the model. For this purpose, decompose y
* into y (endogenous) and x
(exogenous) variables. Rewrite (3):
15 P(w|y)=P ( w , y )/P(y).
16 Hendry does not have a strong interest in non-parametric or non-linear models.
This is hard to justify in a GTS approach. It rules out economic models with multiple
equilibria.9
where q1. are the parameters of interest. If xt is ‘weakly exogenous’ (q1 and q2 are
(4) f(yt Yt 1,w1) f(yt Xt 1,xt,Yt 1,q1)f(xt Xt 1,Yt 1,q2)
variation free), then ‘valid’ and efficient inference on q1 or functions thereof on the
basis of
is possible (where ‘valid’ means: no loss of information). This conditional model can
(5) f(yt Xt 1,xt,Yt 1,q1)
be represented in specific form, usually the Autoregressive Distributed Lag model is
chosen for this purpose (e.g. pp. 87-8):
(where L denotes the lag operator). Note again the comments on implicit and explicit
(6) A(L)yt B(L)xt ut
assumptions mentioned with respect to the VAR-representation of (3), which equally
apply to this case. The final stage of modelling is to consider whether further
restrictions on (6) can be imposed without loss of information. Examples are common
dynamic factors, or other exclusion restrictions.
Destructive testing (by digesting the (mis-)specification test menus of PC-GIVE) aims
at weeding out the invalid models. Remaining rival models are still ‘comparable via the
DGP’ (p. 463). Encompassing tests are supposed to serve this purpose (see below,
Section 6). Wald tests are the preferred tools for, among others, testing common
factors. One reason is computational ease (e.g. p. 152), but the nature of this test
matches the GTS modelling strategy quite well. The Wald test is also used in the
context of encompassing tests (e.g. p. 413).
17
17 A problem with the Wald test is that it is not invariant to mathematically identical
formulations of non-linear restrictions (Godfrey, 1989, p. 65). It is usually assumed that
this does not affect linear restrictions, such as b1=b2. However, an identical formulation
of this restriction is b1/b2 = 1, which may lead to the same problem of invariance.
Hence, using a Wald-type general to specific test may not always be advisable.
Hendry is open minded with respect to the choice of test statistics: usually they are
chosen on pragmatic grounds.10
Hendry’s justification for GTS is based on the invalidity of the test statistics if inference
commences with the simple model:
‘every test is conditional on arbitrary assumptions which are to be tested
later, and if these are rejected all earlier inferences are invalidated,
whether ‘reject’ or ‘not reject’ decisions. Until the model adequately
characterizes the data generation process, it seems rather pointless
trying to test hypotheses of interest in economic theory. A further
drawback is that the significance level of the unstructured sequence of
tests actually being conducted is unknown’ (p. 255).
Four objections to this argument can be made.
First, even the most general empirical model will be ‘wrong’ or mis-specified. Because
of this possibility, Hendry (p. 257) advises testing the general model, but does not
explain how to interpret the resulting test statistics. The validity of the general model
is in the eyes of the beholder.
18 It is revealing that Hendry’s interest has shifted from
systems of equations to single equations (see p. 3), which is hard to justify from a
GTS perspective.
Second, one does not need an ‘adequate’ statistical representation of the DGP (using
sufficient statistics) in order to make inferences. In many cases, stylized facts, a few
figures or rough summary statistics (averages of trials in experimental economics;
eyeball statistics) are able to do the work (note, for example, that statistical modelling
in small particle physics is a rarity; the same appies to game theory). A crucial
ingredient to a theory of reduction should be a convincing argument for the optimal
18 For example, the practical starting point of most of Hendry’s modelling, the
autoregressive distributive lag model (in rational form yt ={ b ( L )/a(L)}xt + {1/a(L)}ut,) is
less general than a transfer function model, yt ={ b ( L )/a(L)}xt +{ m ( L )/r(L)}ut. This
arbitrary specific starting point may lead to invalid inferences, for example, in
investigating the permanent income hypothesis (see Pollock, 1992).11
level of parsimony (simplicity). No such argument is given.
19
Third, pretest bias keeps haunting econometrics, whether they use stepwise
regression, iterative data mining routines, or GTS modelling. Significance levels of the
COMFAC test may be known asymptotically in a GTS modelling strategy (as COMFAC
uses a series of independent tests) (see e.g. pp. 152-3), but the sampling properties
of most other test statistics and even this one are highly obscure outside the context
of repeated sampling (Neyman-Pearson) or valid experimental design (Fisher) (see
Section 6 below).
A more general fourth objection can be raised. Would econometrics be better of if the
GTS methodology were to be adopted? This is doubtful. Empirical econometrics is an
iterative procedure, and very few econometricians have the discipline or desire to obey
the GTS straitjacket. Not surprisingly, econometric practice tends to be gradual
approximation, often by means of variable addition. Unlike Hendry’s warnings, this
practice may yield interesting and useful empirical knowledge. Consider one of the
best examples in recent econometric research: the analysis of the Permanent Income
Hypothesis. This literature, spurred on by publications of Hall, Campbell and Mankiw,
Deaton, Flavin and others, is an example of fruitful variable addition. First, there was
the random walk model. Then we had excess sensitivity and excess smoothness.
These problems had to be explained and were so, among others, by liquidity
constraints. New variables were added to the specifications, and better (more
adequate) empirical approximations were obtained (where those approximations could
be directly related to advances in economic theory). This literature, not hampered by
an overdose of testing and encompassing (see Section 6), may not carry Hendry’s
praise as true examples of science, but the economics profession tends to
disagree.
20 The empirical literature on the permanent income hypothesis is viewed
as a rare success story in macroeconometrics, one of the few cases where
19 See also Keuzenkamp and McAleer (1995).
20 Of course, one may object that economists are not the best judges on the fruits
of econometrics. This would violate a basic rule of economics (and political science):
the consumer (voter) is always right.12
econometric analysis actually added to economic understanding of macroeconomic
phenomena--a case where theory and empirical research iterated to a better
understanding of economics.
21
5. Falsificationism and the three cheers for testing
‘The three golden rules of econometrics are test, test and test;
22 that all three rules
are broken regularly in empirical applications is fortunately easily remedied’ (pp. 27-8).
Testing is the main virtue of a scientific econometrics, Hendry claims. This idea is
related to a philosophy of science that was taught during Hendry’s years at the London
School of Economics (LSE) by Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos. Their philosophy of
falsificationism (Popper) and the methodology of scientific research programmes
(Lakatos) frequently recur in Hendry’s writings.
According to Popper, one can never prove a theory right, but one may be able to
falsify it by devising a ‘crucial experiment’. Falsifiability separates science from
metaphysics. Real scientists should formulate bold conjectures and try not to verify but
to falsify. There are numerous problems with this view.
23 I will mention some that are
relevant here. A crucial experiment is probably rare in physics (it may even be a
scientific myth), and more so in economics. In fact, economics has hardly any
experimentation at all (and where there is experimentation -as in game theory-
econometrics is rarely invoked for purposes of inference). Sometimes one can find the
21 Hendry’s contribution to this literature is contained as Chapter 10 in the volume
of papers. It is shown that an error correction model is able to ‘encompass’ Hall’s
random walk model of consumption in the context of UK data. There is no doubt that
Hendry’s specification provides a better approximation to the data. However, it was not
Hall’s point to obtain the best possible approximation. A similar remark applies to the
discussion between Hendry and Ericsson (1991) and Friedman and Schwartz (1991).
22 A footnote is added here: ‘Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in calculating
and controlling type I and II errors’ (p. 28).
23 See e.g. the excellent treatment in Hacking (1983).13
claim that econometric modelling may serve as a substitute for the experimental
method,
24 but I am rather sceptical about such a claim (see also Section 6). The
three cheers for testing may suggest that Hendry takes falsificationism seriously, but
if so, then only without Popper’s bold conjectures.
25
The idea that scientists cannot prove theories, but may be able to falsify them,
attributed to Popper, was a common sense notion in the statistical literature since (at
least) the turn of this century. One can find this, explicitly, in the writings of Karl
Pearson, Ronald Aylmer Fisher, Harold Jeffreys, Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson,
26
Frederick Mills, Jan Tinbergen, Tjalling Koopmans, and probably many others.
27 They
did not need philosophical consultation for gaining this insight, neither did they render
it a philosophical dogma according to which falsification becomes the highest virtue
of a scientist.
28 Econometricians are, in this respect, just like other scientists: they
rarely aim at falsifying, but try to construct satisfactory empirical models.
29 Of course,
‘satisfactory’ needs to be defined, and this is difficult. Philosophers like Van Fraassen
have dealt with this issue but econometricians may find more wisdom in the Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, to mention just one research outlet that owes
much to Hendry’s stimulus, rather than tracts in the philosophy of science literature in
order to clarify the operational meaning of ‘satisfactory’.
24 For example, expressed in Goldberger (1964). See also Morgan (1990, pp. 9-10
and p. 259).
25 Darnell and Evans (1990), who (unlike me) make an effort to uphold the
Popperian approach to econometrics (meanwhile having a quasi-Bayesian
interpretation of probability) similarly complain that Hendry does not deliver the
Popperian good.
26 Although with a twist in their case, as they are interested in behaviour rather
than inference.
27 Citations available on request.
28 According to Mark Blaug, an important difference between Popper and those
statisticians is Popper’s banning of immunizing strategems. Whether an absolute ban
would benefit science is doubtful. See Keuzenkamp and McAleer (1995) for a
discussion of ‘ad hocness’ and inference, in particular the references to Jeffreys.
29 See Keuzenkamp and Barten (1995).14
So far for Popper, Hendry’s favourite philosopher. His second idol is Lakatos. Lakatos
(1970) noted that, in practice, few scientific theories are given up because of a
particular falsification. Moreover, scientists may try to obtain support for their theories.
He accepted a ‘whiff of inductivism’. In order to appraise scientific theories, Lakatos
inventedthenotionof‘progressive’ and‘degenerative’scientific researchprogrammes,
which can be on theoretical, heuristic and empirical grounds. A research programme
is theoretically progressive if it predicts some novel, unexpected fact. It is empirically
progressive if some of those predictions are confirmed. Finally, a research programme
is heuristically progressive if it is able to avoid or even to reduce the dependency on
auxiliary hypotheses that do not follow from the ‘positive heuristic’, the general
guidelines of the research programme.
It is very difficult to encounter a single novel fact in Lakatos’ sense in the econometric
literature, and the papers of Hendry are no exception. Moreover, it is totally unclear
what kind of heuristic in an economic research programme drives Hendry’s empirical
investigations, apart from a few rather elementary economic relations concerning
consumption or money demand. Hendry does not predict novel facts. What he is able
to do is provide novel interpretations of given facts, which is something entirely
different. Lakatos (1970, p. 176) once criticized the
‘patched-up, unimaginative series of pedestrian "empirical" adjustments
which are so frequent, for instance, in modern social psychology. Such
adjustments may,with thehelp of so-called"statistical techniques",make
some "novel" predictions and may even conjure up some irrelevant
grains of truth in them. But this theorizing has no unifying idea, no
heuristic power, no continuity.’
In order to invoke Lakatos, one needs to provide the necessary ingredients of a
research programme, in particular the driving ‘heuristic’. This is very difficult to do, and
the notion that there are some long run relationships in economics which hardly go
beyond what can be found in introductory macroeconomics textbooks, together with
the view that people adjust according to an error-correcting scheme, seems to be an15
insufficient heuristic for a well-defined research programme.
30
However, Hendry also applies the notion of progressiveness to his methodology itself,
rather than to the economic implementations:
‘The methodology itself has also progressed and gradually has been
able both to explain more of what we observe to occur in empirical
econometrics and to predict the general consequences of certain
research strategies’ (p. 417).
Here a ‘meta research programme’ is at stake: not neo-classical economics, for
example, but the method of inference is regarded as a research programme, with a
heuristic, and all the other Lakatosian notions (hard core, protective belt, novel facts).
Hendry’s positive heuristic is then to ‘test, test and test’. The hard core might be the
notion of a DGP to be modelled using ‘dynamic econometrics’. Probably the most
promising candidate for a ‘novel fact’ is the insight that, if autocorrelation in the
residuals is removed by means of a Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) transformation, this may
impose an invalid common factor: the transformed residuals may behave as a white
noise process but they are not innovations. This is an important insight. Whether the
stated heuristic is sufficient for defining a research programme, and whether this novel
fact satisfies the desire for progression, is a matter on which disagreement may (and
does) exist.
Apart from the dubious relation to the philosophy of science literature, there is a very
different problem with Hendry’s golden rules, which is that the statistical meaning of
his tests is unclear. Standard errors and other ‘statistics’ presented in time series
econometrics do not have the same interpretation for statistical inference as they have
in situations of experimental data. In econometrics, standard errors are just
30 Note moreover that the recent shift to co-integration, which can also be found
in Hendry’s writings, weakens the error correcting view of the world. The links between
co-integration and error correction are less strong than at first sight may seem (see
Pagan, 1994).16
measurements of the precision of estimates, given the particular measurement system
(econometric model) at hand. They are not test statistics. At times, Hendry seems to
agree with this interpretation. For example,
‘Genuine testing can therefore only occur after the design process is
complete and new evidence has accrued against which to test. Because
new data has been collected since chapter 8 was published, the validity
of the model could be investigated on the basis of Neyman-Pearson
(1933) "quality control" tests’ (p. 420).
This statement also suggests that encompassing tests (discussed in the next section)
are not ‘genuine’ tests (indeed, sometimes encompassing is presented as a form of
mis-specification testing).
The reference to Neyman-Pearson in the quotation is only partly valid. Neyman-
Pearson emphasizes the context of decision making in repetitive situations (hence, the
theory is based on repeated sampling). In Hendry’s case, a number of additional
observations has been collected, but Hendry’s aim is not decision making but
inference.
31
Occasionally, instead of the words ‘statistical tests’, the words ‘diagnostic checks’ are
used. But not in the trinity, the three golden rules. Would they have the same aural
appeal if they were ‘check, check and check’, or ‘measure, measure and measure’?
It is doubtful, although as rules they seem more appropriate. Econometricians measure
rather than test, and the obsession with testing is rather deplorable. Indeed, a final
problem with excessive testing is that, once the number of test statistics exceeds the
number of observations used to calculate them, one may wonder how well the aim of
reduction has been served, and what the meaning of the tests really is. Hendry and
Ericsson (1991) provide an example. Given 93 annual observations, 46 test statistics
31 See Keuzenkamp and Magnus (1995) for a discussion of Neyman-Pearson
methods.17
are reported. If standard errors of estimates are included, this number grows to 108.
It grows further once the implicit (eyeball) test statistics conveyed by the figures are
considered.
Two final remarks on statistical tests: first, there is always the problem of choosing the
appropriate significance level (why does 5% deserves special attention?)--a problem
not specific to Hendry’s methodology; second, a statistical rejection may not be an
economically meaningful rejection. If rational behaviour (in whatever sense) is
statistically rejected (even if the context is literally one of repeated sampling) at some
significance level, this does not mean that the objects of inference could increase their
utility by changing behaviour. Money-metric test statistics would be more informative
in econometric inference than statistical tests, but such tests are not discussed by
Hendry or most econometricians (to the best of my knowledge, Hal Varian is a sole
exception). This issue is of importance in many (proclaimed) tests of perfect markets
currently presented in the finance literature.
6. Model design and inference
Hendry argues that all models are derived from the DGP and, therefore, also the
properties of the models are derived entities. One does not need to invoke a DGP to
arrive at this important insight of non-experimental data analysis (e.g., replace ‘DGP’
by ‘data’) - after all, what is this thing called ‘DGP’? However, Hendry’s emphasis on
this insight deserves praise. Indeed,
‘... the consequence of given data and a given theory model is that the
error is the derived component, and one cannot make "separate"
assumptions about it properties’ (p. 73).
One of the strengths of Hendry’s methodological observations is his recognition of the
importance of model design. I agree that models are econometricians’ constructs, and18
the residuals are ‘derived rather than autonomous’ and, hence, models can ‘be
designed to satisfy pre-selected criteria ’ (p. 246). The distribution of the residuals
cannot be stated a priori, as may be done in specific situations of experimental design
(see Fisher, 1960). The ‘axiom of correct specification’ (Leamer, 1978) does not hold,
which is why the econometrician has to investigate the characteristics of the derived
residuals. Model design aims at constructing models that satisfy a set of desired
statistical criteria. Models should be sufficient statistics.
However, this has strong implications for the interpretation of the statistical inferences
that are made in econometric investigations. Most importantly, the tests are not
straightforward instances of Neyman-Pearson or Fisherian tests.
32 Accommodating
the data (description) is crucially different from inference (prediction), in particular if the
model that accommodates the data is not supported by a priori considerations.
33
In the case of model design, the model simultaneously ‘designs’ its hypothetical
universe. Hence, the model, given the data, cannot be used for the purpose of
inference about the universe as the universe is constructed during the modelling stage,
and is unique to the particular set of data which were used to construct it. Fisher
(1955, p. 71), criticizing repeated sampling in Neyman and Pearson’s theory, argues:
‘if we possess a unique sample in Student’s sense on which significance
tests are to be performed, there is always,a s Venn (1876) in particular
has shown, a multiplicity of populations to each of which we can
legitimately regard our sample as belonging: so that the phrase
32 See Keuzenkamp and Magnus (1995) for further details about both approaches.
33 See Howson (1988) for a useful view on accommodation and prediction, from
a Bayesian perspective. Howson claims that the predictionist thesis is false. This
thesis is that accommodation does not yield inductive support to a hypothesis,
whereas independent prediction does. Howson’s claim is valid (roughly speaking) if the
hypothesis has independent a priori appeal. Dharmapala and McAleer (1995), who
deal with (objective) truth values instead of degees of belief, share Howson’s claim,
but quite naturally ignore the condition of a priori support. In the kind of econometric
model design, where ad hoc considerations play an important role, the predictionist
thesis remains relevant once dealing with degrees of belief.19
‘repeated sampling from the same population’ does not enable us to
determine which population is to be used to define the probability level,
for no one of them has objective reality, all being products of the
statistician’s imagination.’
This does not imply that Fisher rejected statistical inference in cases of unique
samples. However, he thought experimental design a crucial element for valid
inference. Economic theory is not an alternative to experimental design, in particular
in macroeconomics where many rival theories are available. Model design
(accommodation) is not an alternative either, if the ad hoc element in modelling
reduces the prior support of the model. The real test, therefore, remains the ability to
predict out of sample and in different contexts. Friedman (1940, p. 659) made this
point when he reviewed Tinbergen’s work for the League of Nations:
‘Tinbergen’s results cannot be judged by ordinary tests of statistical
significance. The reason is that the variables with which he winds up ...
have been selected after an extensive process of trial and error because
they yield high coefficients of correlation’ (emphasis in original).
This conveys the same message as Friedman’s reply (in the postscript to Friedman
and Schwartz, 1991) to Hendry and Ericsson (1991). Indeed, Hendry (pp. 425-6) also
argues that a real test is possible if (genuinely) new data become available, whereas
the test statistics obtained in the stage of model design ‘demonstrate the
appropriateness (or otherwise) of the design exercise’.
The position of Friedman and Schwartz, who do not rely on modern econometric
methods but are aware of the fundamental issues in statistics, might be related to
Leamer’s (1978) emphasis on sensitivity analysis, in combination with a strong
emphasis on the importance of new data. Econometrics may not be the only, or most
useful, method to find, or test, interesting hypotheses. Theory is an alternative, or even
a careful (non-statistical) study of informative historical events (like the stock market20
crash).
34 There are few occasions where statistical tests have changed the minds of
mainstream economists (with liquidity constraints in consumption behaviour arguably
being a rare exception).
The hypothesis that most human behaviour follows an error-correcting pattern has not
been accepted in economic textbooks, whereas Hall’s consumption model and the
more recent related literature is a standard topic in such books. Why is this so?
Perhaps it is because the adequacy criteria in model design do not necessarily
correspond to the requirements for an increase in knowledge of economic behaviour.
Even the ability to ‘encompass’ Hall’s model does not necessarily contribute to
progress in economic knowledge. Encompassing, Hendry (p. 440) argues,
‘seems to correspond to a "progressive research strategy" [...] in that
encompassing models act like "sufficient statistics" to summarize the
pre-existing state of knowledge.’
35
As noted above, this is not what Lakatos meant by progress. Hendry is able to provide
novel interpretations of existing data or models, but this is not equivalent to predicting
novel facts. However, encompassing might provide a viable alternative to the
Popperian concept of verisimilitude (closeness to the truth). Popper’s formal definition
of verisimilitude has collapsed in view of the problem of false theories. Encompassing
does not necessarily suffer from this problem due to the availability of pseudo
maximum likelihood estimators (where the models do not have to be correctly
specified). Here is a potential subject where econometrics may contribute to
philosophy of science.
34 See also Summers (1991).
35 Between the square brackets, among others a reference to Lakatos is given.
Hendry and Ericsson (1991, p. 22) make nearly the same claim, using a very subtle
change of words. Encompassing is ‘consistent with the concept of a progressive
research strategy [...] since an encompassing model is a "sufficient representative" of
previous empirical findings.’ One wonders whether the move from ‘statistic’ to
‘representative’ has any deeper meaning (as in the distinction between a ‘test’ and a
‘check’).21
7. Conclusion: alchemy or science?
The quest for the Holy Grail resulted in a shattering of the brotherhood of the Round
Table. Still, some of the knights gained worship. A quest for the DGP in econometrics
is more likely to gain econometricians disrespect. Like making gold for the alchemists,
searching for the DGP is a wrong aim for econometrics. Relying on the trinity of tests
may be respectable, but does not deliver the status of science. The Popperian
straitjacket does not fit econometrics (or any other science). Model design makes
econometrics as scientific as fashion design. Modelling is an art, and one in which
Hendry excels.
Occasionally, Hendry interprets models as ‘useful approximations’ (e.g. p. 276). Karl
Pearson, a founder of statistics and an early positivist, argued along those lines, and
so did other great statisticians in the tradition of British empiricism (in particular, Fisher
and Jeffreys). Of course, the issue is: approximations to what? If the answer is the
Holy Grail, known as the DGP, then econometrics is destined to be a branch of
alchemy or, worse, metaphysics. Popperian cosmetics will not render econometrics
a scientific status. If, on the other hand, the answer is approximations to the data,
helping to classify the facts of economics, econometrics may join the positivist tradition
which, in a number of cases, has yielded respectable pieces of knowledge. Criticism
is an important ingredient of this positivist tradition, but not a methodological dogma.22
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